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Do consumers take advantage of common pricing standards?  
An experimental investigation 
 
1.  Introduction 
One of the main mechanisms by which competitive markets are maintained is the ability and 
willingness of consumers to compare the offers of alternative suppliers and to buy at the cheapest 
price.  As behavioural theories of individual choice have gained ground in economics, there has been 
increasing concern about the possibility that, by presenting offers with spurious complexity or 
‘obfuscation’, firms can make price comparisons artificially difficult and so blunt price competition 
(e.g. Ellison, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Spiegler, 2006; Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Office of 
Fair Trading, 2011).  Gaudeul and Sugden (2012) have pointed out that many forms of obfuscation 
work at the level of the market rather than at that of the individual firm.  In these cases, the problem 
is not so much that the pricing schemes used by individual firms are unnecessarily complex in 
themselves, but rather that firms collectively do not quote prices in terms of common standards that 
would allow consumers to make simple price comparisons.  For example, an often-cited form of 
obfuscation is the advertising of headline prices which exclude add-ons (such as delivery charges for 
products bought online, or baggage charges for air travel) that are over-priced or would customarily 
be included in quoted prices, or exclude excessive charges contingent on events which customers may 
fail to anticipate (such as overdraft fees on bank accounts).  Except where add-ons are in fact 
unavoidable, breaking down services into separately-priced components expands consumer choice, 
and should not be a cause for concern in itself.  The problem is that consumers tend to focus on 
headline prices when making overall price comparisons.  Headline prices have more information 
content, the greater the degree to which there are market-wide conventions about what is included in 
headline prices and about how charges for add-ons are set.  Obfuscation takes the form of the 
absence of such conventions, or the failure of firms to comply with them.  Another way in which 
posted prices may not allow direct comparisons across products is through the use of non-
standardized units of quantity or price.  For example, different sellers of a product may use different 
package sizes and display per-package rather than per-unit prices, or use different conventions of 
measurement (such as different statistics for expressing interest rates), or offer idiosyncratic discounts 
(such as ‘three for the price of two’).   
The persistence of these market-level forms of obfuscation is somewhat surprising, in view of 
the self-reinforcing properties of trading conventions in general.  Economists have often argued that 
processes of competition spontaneously induce market-wide conventions about (for example) the 
medium of exchange, the specifications of complementary products, the location of shopping areas, 
and the dates and times at which trading takes place (Menger, 1892; Schotter, 1981; Sugden, 2004).  
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One might have expected a similar mechanism to lead to the emergence of common pricing standards.  
The intuition is that, since price comparisons are easier and more accurate when there are common 
standards, buyers who are drawing up shortlists of offers to consider in more detail will favour offers 
that are priced in common standards.  Such a tendency would create incentives for sellers to conform 
to common standards as a way of gaining market share, and for retail platforms to enforce these 
standards.1  Since competition is more intense when price comparisons are less noisy, these effects 
might lead to a virtuous circle: common standards could come to be signals of competitive prices, 
increasing the incentive for consumers to favour products priced in those standards.  Gaudeul and 
Sugden (2012) present a model of this mechanism, and suggest that the absence of common standards 
in some real-world markets may be a sign that the spontaneous evolution of common standards has 
been obstructed by tacit collusion. 
In this paper, we investigate whether buyers in fact discriminate in favour of common-
standard offers.  We report an experiment that elicited responses to price comparison tasks that were 
structured like those represented in Gaudeul and Sugden’s model.  Subjects were incentivized to 
search for the lowest price in a set of alternative offers.  The experiment was designed to test two 
related hypotheses: that consumers benefit from the existence of common standards, even if all 
suppliers do not use them, and that consumers discriminate in favour offers that are priced in terms of 
such standards.  If these hypotheses held for real-world consumers, the mechanism modelled by 
Gaudeul and Sugden would operate: there would be a self-reinforcing tendency for market 
competition to induce the emergence of common standards, and for that tendency to work to the 
benefit of consumers.  
We compared behaviour in three types of task.  In all common standard (AC) tasks, all 
offers were priced in a single common standard.  In part common standard (PC) tasks, a subset of 
offers were priced in a common standard; each other offer had its own individuated standard.  In no 
common standard (NC) tasks, every offer had an individuated standard.  The results of our tests were 
negative.  Although subjects were much better able to find low prices in AC tasks than in the other 
tasks, there was little evidence of their finding lower prices in PC tasks than in NC tasks.  In PC 
tasks, with other relevant factors held constant, common-standard offers were more likely than other 
offers to be inspected, but less likely to be chosen.   
To our initial surprise, however, we found patterns in our data that were suggestive of the 
effects of a decision rule which, as far as we know, has not previously been investigated in the context 
                                                     
1 Ellison and Ellison (2009: 434-5) describe a case of such enforcement, which occurred during their 
study of Pricewatch, an internet search engine for the purchase of computer parts.  Recognising that 
many sellers were adding excessive shipping fees at the check-out stage, and presumably aiming to 
protect the value of the price-comparison service that it was supplying, Pricewatch required all firms 
to offer a standard form of ground shipping with prescribed maximum charges. 
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of common pricing standards.  When a shortlist of potentially choiceworthy offers is being 
constructed, this dominance editing rule eliminates any offer that is found to have a higher price than 
some other offer that is priced in the same standard.  Thus, other things being equal, a firm’s offer is 
more likely to be shortlisted, the fewer other offers are priced in the same standard.  In principle, a 
consumer who uses this rule could (and rationally, ought to) recognize that the expected value of a 
shortlisted offer is higher, the more same-standard offers it has been found to dominate.  But 
recognizing that requires sophisticated reasoning.  If cross-standard price comparisons are subject to 
error, and if consumers treat all offers equally when making such comparisons, the dominance editing 
rule can have perverse effects on firms’ market shares: consumers’ attempts to take advantage of the 
simplifying properties of a common standard provide firms with incentives not to use that standard.  
Further analysis of our experimental data established that many subjects did indeed use dominance 
editing, and did not offset the resulting bias when making cross-standard comparisons.  Thus, our 
findings provide evidence of the use of a decision rule which can obstruct the development of 
common pricing standards. 
2.  Shorlisting heuristics 
For many years, psychologists and consumer researchers have been interested in two-stage consider-
then-choose decision processes (e.g. Payne, 1976; Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990; Hauser, 2010).  
Recently, economists have begun to investigate these processes too, and to consider the incentives 
that firms may have to tailor their offers to meet consumers’ shortlisting criteria rather than to satisfy 
their actual preferences (e.g. Manzini and Mariotti, 2007; Eliaz, Richter and Rubinstein, 2011; Eliaz 
and Spiegler, 2011).  The essential idea in these literatures is that, when a consumer faces a large 
choice set, he or she economizes on cognitive effort by using ‘quick and dirty’ heuristics to select a 
subset of options – the shortlist or consideration set – for further investigation.  The final choice is 
then made from that subset using a procedure which tracks the consumers’ preferences more 
accurately but is cognitively more costly.  Shortlisting heuristics are understood as procedures that 
screen options relative to criteria that are easily observable, psychologically salient, and (in most 
models) positively correlated with the consumer’s actual preferences.  Examples of such heuristics 
include eliminating options that lack some pre-determined desirable quality (Tversky, 1972) or are 
transparently dominated by other options (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), shortlisting options with 
recognized names (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002), and shortlisting options that immediately engage 
attention (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011).   
Gaudeul and Sugden’s (2012) model represents a different kind of two-stage decision-
making.  In this model, shortlisting is not an attempt to pick options that are expected to score highly 
on the scale of the consumer’s true preferences.  Instead, the aim is to construct the largest set of 
options that can easily and accurately be compared with one another on that scale.  In other words, 
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the consideration set is constructed so that the second stage of decision-making can be carried out by 
using quick and clean processes.  One significant feature of this form of shortlisting is that its use by 
consumers incentivizes (non-colluding) firms to converge on common standards. 
In Gaudeul and Sugden’s model, a consumer faces a choice set of n offers, from which she 
must choose one.  Each offer i can be described by a pair (pi, si) where pi is the final price and si is 
the standard in which the price is expressed.  The consumer’s objective is to minimize the final price 
paid.  She observes the standard of each offer, but is not directly informed about its final price.  She 
is given information from which the final price can be reconstructed, but that reconstruction requires 
her to use cognitive processes that are liable to error.  These processes are modelled by means of the 
assumption that, for each offer i, the consumer ‘observes’ a price signal pi + , where  is an i.i.d. 
random variable with zero mean and non-zero variance.  The price signal is interpreted as the 
consumer’s reconstruction of the final price of an offer whose actual price is pi;  represents error.  
For simplicity, the distribution of  is assumed to be independent both of the final price and of the 
standard in which the price is expressed.  One way in which the consumer can form a preference 
between two offers is by comparing their price signals (i.e. by attempting to reconstruct their final 
prices).  This is the calculating operation.  However, she is also capable of forming preferences by 
using another, independent mental operation, the ranking operation.  This operation generates an 
accurate ordinal ranking of every pair of prices pi, pj for which si = sj, but cannot rank prices that are 
not expressed in the same standard. 
If all offers are expressed in individuated standards, the consumer has to rely on the 
calculating operation; the best she can do is to choose the offer with the lowest price signal.  But if 
the choice set contains at least two offers with a common standard, it is possible that the expected 
price she pays will be lower if instead she uses the largest common standard (LCS) heuristic.  The 
first stage of this heuristic identifies the largest (or an equal-largest) set of offers such that all offers in 
this consideration set have a common standard.  The second stage uses the ranking operation to find 
the lowest final price in the consideration set. 
As a stylized example, consider a consumer facing a choice set of three offers.  The final 
prices p1, p2 and p3 are independent draws from a uniform distribution over [1, 2].  Offers 1 and 2 are 
expressed in a common standard; offer 3 is expressed in an individuated standard.  (To fill in the 
story, suppose the consumer is buying bottled water, and wants to buy at the lowest price per litre.  
Suppliers quote their prices per bottle, and declare the capacities of their bottles.  Firms 1 and 2 use 
the same size of bottle; firm 3 uses a different size.  The consumer has difficulty with calculations 
that involve division.)  If the consumer used the LCS heuristic, her expected payment would be 1.33 
(the expected value of the lower of two randomly drawn prices).  If she were able to use the 
calculating operation without error, her expected payment would be 1.25 (the expected value of the 
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lowest of three randomly drawn prices).  But, depending on the variance of the error term, the 
expected value of the lowest of the three price signals can be greater than 1.33 (the upper limit of this 
expectation is 1.5).2 
Gaudeul and Sugden’s analysis is mainly concerned with how prices and standards evolve in 
a market in which some or all consumers use the LCS heuristic.  But this heuristic is just one 
(particularly simple) way in which consumers can benefit by discriminating in favour of common-
standard offers.  Consider a consumer in the Gaudeul–Sugden model who faces a choice set of n 
offers, the final prices of which are independent draws from a common distribution.  Suppose that 
two or more of these offers are priced in a single common standard, and that the rest are priced in 
individuated standards.  The consumer initially knows only which offers are common-standard, and 
has to pick a shortlist of offers for which she will learn the price signals and (for common-standard 
offers) relative price rankings; she will then choose optimally from that shortlist.  Assume that some 
constant cost, the same for both types of offer, is incurred for every shortlisted offer, or alternatively, 
that the number of shortlisted offers cannot be greater than some value m, where 1 < m < n.     
Since the consumer will receive unambiguously more information about each common-
standard offer than about each individuated-standard one, it is immediately obvious that, for any given 
size of shortlist (greater than one), it is rational for her to include as many common-standard offers as 
possible.  Equivalently, the more common-standard offers that she puts on a shortlist of given size, 
the lower is the expected final price paid.  Thus, a rational consumer benefits from the presence of 
common-standard offers.  The procedure by which she achieves these benefits discriminates in 
favour of such offers at the shortlisting stage. 
Now consider how a rational consumer will choose from a shortlist in which some but not all 
offers are common-standard.  Consider a shortlist containing m offers (where m ≥ 3), of which m 
(where 1 < m < m) share a common standard, the other offers being individuated-standard; as before, 
final prices are independent draws from a common distribution.  To choose optimally, the consumer 
has to integrate the information contained in the m price signals with that contained in the ranking of 
the m common-standard offers.  This is a difficult mathematical problem for which we have been 
unable to find a general solution.  However, it is clear that the optimal choice will always be either 
(a) the shortlisted offer with the lowest price signal or (b) the shortlisted common-standard offer with 
the lowest final price (as revealed by the ranking operation).  If price signals are fully informative, 
                                                     
2 As this example illustrates, the LCS heuristic has some similarities with modes of reasoning that 
generate the decoy (or asymmetric dominance) effect (Huber et al., 1982; Shafir et al., 1993).  In the 
example, a consumer who uses the LCS heuristic recognizes that one of the common-standard offers 
dominates the other, and for that reason, chooses it from the set of three. 
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the optimal choice is always (a), and so the ex ante probability of choosing a common-standard offer 
is m/m.  If they are completely uninformative, the optimal choice is always (b), and so the ex ante 
probability of choosing a common-standard offer is 1.  It seems intuitive that, the less informative 
price signals are, the more reliance the consumer will place on the ranking operation.  We therefore 
conjecture that if price signals are less than fully informative, the ex ante probability of choosing a 
common-standard offer is greater than m/m.  In other words, when choosing from a shortlist, a 
rational consumer will discriminate in favour of common-standard offers. 
Finally, consider the ex ante probability that a rational consumer will choose the best 
shortlisted offer (i.e. the shortlisted offer with the lowest final price).  If she used only the calculating 
operation, this probability would be independent of whether that offer was common- or individuated-
standard.  But in fact the consumer receives additional information from the ranking operation.  If 
the best shortlisted offer is common-standard, that offer is necessarily the best shortlisted common-
standard offer, and so the ranking operation provides additional support for choosing it.  Thus, the 
best shortlisted offer is more likely to be chosen if it is common-standard than if it is individuated- 
standard. 
Since our concern is with the behaviour of consumers in real-world markets, we do not want 
to put too much weight on results derived from models of ideally rational decision-making.  
Nevertheless, the analysis we have presented provides some support for the hypotheses that our 
experiment was designed to test. 
3.  Experimental design: principles 
Our experimental design used the same framework as the model described in Section 2.  Subjects 
chose from sets of alternative offers, with an incentive to find the lowest final price.  In most of our 
experimental tasks, final prices were not stated directly.  Instead, subjects (who were not allowed to 
use calculating aids) were given information from which final prices could be calculated by addition 
and/or multiplication.  For example, a final price of 10.07 ‘points’ (the experimental currency unit) 
might be expressed by means of the price details ‘10.60 points  95%’.  We chose the parameters 
with the intention that calculating final prices would require some cognitive effort, and that subjects 
would be likely to make some errors in these calculations (or, alternatively, would choose to rely on 
approximations rather than exact calculations).  Notice that the error mechanism in the experiment 
was a property of the subjects’ own reasoning, not a property of an external random mechanism.  
Our aim was to test how human decision makers choose in situations in which they might reasonably 
expect their own decision-making processes to be subject to error. 
In each task, there were 24 offers, all with the same offer type.  For example, the offers 
described by the price details ‘10.60 points  95%’, ‘9.50 points  95%’ and ‘12.20 points  86%’ all 
8 
 
have the type (which we will later denote ‘P*D’) in which the final price is described as ‘original 
price  y%’, where y is a variable.  Within a given task, two offers have a common standard if an 
accurate ordinal comparison of them can be made simply by ranking their original prices.  For 
example, ‘10.60 points  95%’ and ‘9.50 points  95%’ have a common standard.  An offer has an 
individuated standard if it cannot be compared in this way with any other offer in the task. 
The experiment used four types of task.  In the benchmark task, the final price of each offer 
was identical to the original price.  All other tasks used offer types in which original and final prices 
were different.  In all common standard (AC) tasks, all 24 offers had a common standard.  In no 
common standard (NC) tasks, all 24 offers had individuated standards.  In part common standard 
(PC) tasks, eight of the 24 offers had a single common standard; the other 16 offers had individuated 
standards.  The PC tasks are the tasks most directly related to the real-world target of our work, 
namely markets in which some but not all products are priced in common standards.  However, by 
comparing responses to NC and PC tasks we were able to assess the incremental effect of common 
standards on subjects’ ability to make accurate price comparisons.  The AC tasks allowed us to test 
whether subjects were able to recognize that common-standard offers could be compared simply by 
ranking their original prices.  Since recognizing this is a precondition for understanding the value of 
discriminating in favour of common-standard offers in PC tasks, experience of AC tasks should be 
expected to facilitate such discrimination.  By using equal numbers of NC, AC and PC tasks, we 
tried to avoid steering subjects either towards or away from using the ranking operation. 
In all tasks, the distribution of final prices was the same.  Final prices were uncorrelated 
with standards, and so the fact that a particular offer was or was not priced using a common standard 
contained no information about its final price.  This provided a neutral setting for investigating how 
(if at all) individuals made use of common standards when choosing between offers.  The 
experimental interface between subject and task was designed to allow us to track significant aspects 
of subjects’ reasoning, and thus to look for the fingerprints of heuristics that subjects might be using.  
At the start of any task, offers were presented in a way that allowed subjects to identify which, if any, 
used a common standard, but subjects were required to make specific mouse clicks to reveal further 
information about specific offers.  These mechanisms enabled us to track which offers were 
inspected in which order. 
The experiment was designed on the working assumption that subjects are less able to make 
accurate price comparisons across standards than within a common standard.  The following 
hypothesis states this assumption in a testable form:  
Hypothesis 1:  The average final price of chosen offers is lower in AC tasks than in NC 
tasks. 
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As explained in Section 1, the experiment was designed to test two general hypotheses: that 
consumers benefit from the existence of common standards, even if those standards are not in 
universal use, and that when some but not all offers are priced in a common standard, consumers 
favour common-standard offers.  In the context of our design, the first of these hypotheses can be 
expressed as:  
Hypothesis 2:  The average final price of chosen offers is lower in PC tasks than in NC 
tasks.  
The idea that common-standard offers are favoured can be expressed in several different 
ways.  We will be concerned with three kinds of favouring, expressed in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3:  In PC tasks, the proportion of common-standard offers that are inspected 
is greater than the corresponding proportion of individuated-standard offers. 
Hypothesis 4:  In PC tasks, the probability that the chosen offer is common-standard is 
greater than the relative frequency of common-standard offers in the set of inspected 
offers. 
Hypothesis 5:  In PC tasks, the probability that the best inspected offer (i.e. the inspected 
offer with the lowest final price) is chosen is higher if the best inspected offer is common-
standard than if it is individuated-standard. 
Hypothesis 3 proposes that, other things being equal, individuals are more likely to inspect offers that 
use common standards.  Recall that, in our experiment, subjects were given no offer-specific 
information about the final price of an offer until they inspected it.  Thus, with respect to final prices, 
each subject’s set of inspected offers was a random sample of the set of all 24 offers, irrespective of 
whether common-standard offers were favoured or disfavoured at the inspection stage.  Hypotheses 
4 and 5 propose that, after controlling for differential rates of inspection, individuals favour common-
standard offers when choosing among inspected offers.  Hypothesis 4 is framed in terms of common-
standard offers in general, and so aggregates across common-standard offers with different final 
prices, while Hypothesis 5 refers only to the best available inspected offer.  
As explained in Section 2, Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 (and, we conjecture, Hypothesis 4) are 
implications of the Gaudeul-Sugden model under the assumption of rational choice.  However, these 
hypotheses are framed in terms of benchmarks that are significant for the functioning of markets.  
Whether or not consumers are ideally rational, it is important to know whether they benefit from 
common standards (Hypothesis 2), whether common-standard offers in general are more likely to be 
chosen than individuated-standard ones (as implied by Hypotheses 3 and 4), and whether a firm that 
sets a final price below those of its competitors can gain market share by pricing in a common 
standard (as implied by Hypotheses 3 and 5).       
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4.  Experimental design: details 
The experiment had a within-subject design.  Each subject completed ten different tasks presented in 
randomized order on a computer screen.  In each task, a subject was given an ‘endowment’, and was 
required to buy one unit of a notional good by accepting one of 24 alternative price ‘offers’.  All 
final prices were lower than the endowment.  Endowments and prices were expressed in ‘payment 
points’.  In each task, the subject was credited with payment points equal to the endowment minus 
the final price of the chosen offer.  At the end of the experiment the computer randomly picked one 
of the ten tasks; the subject’s earnings from the experiment were equal to her payment points from 
that task, converted into UK pounds using an ‘exchange rate’ that was specific to the task.  Thus, in 
each task, subjects had an incentive to choose the offer with the lowest final price. 
In every task, the money value of the endowment (converted at the task-specific exchange 
rate) was £32.  The set of final prices, expressed in UK pounds, was the same in all tasks, except for 
rounding; these unrounded prices ranged from £20.270 to £28.895, in increments of £0.375.  
Keeping the set of final prices constant was important in allowing controlled hypothesis tests.  
However, it was also important that subjects did not recognize this feature of the design and use it to 
simplify their decision problems (for example, by remembering the value of the lowest price).  Thus, 
although subjects were told at the start of the experiment that the endowment would always have a 
converted value of £32, they were not told that the distribution of converted final prices was the same 
in all tasks.  Nor were they told anything about these distributions other than that, in every task, the 
highest price was always lower than the endowment.  The exchange rate was generated randomly, 
independently for each subject and for each task.  It was expressed in the form ‘x points = £1’, where 
x was a round number in the interval 10 ≤ x ≤ 100.  The price details of the offers in a task were then 
constructed so as to be consistent with the relevant exchange rate.  For example, an offer with a final 
price of £20.27 and the offer type P*D might appear in one task with an exchange rate of 12 points = 
£1 and an endowment of 384 points, and be described as ‘original price = 676 points; final price = 
original price  36%’.  The same offer might appear in another task with an exchange rate of 43 
points = £1, an endowment of 1376 points, and the description ‘original price = 1063 points; final 
price = original price  82%’. 
In any given task, all offers were expressed in terms of the same offer type.  The following 
four offer types were used: 
(1)  Type P:  Price details are described as a single price such as:  
Final price = x points 
where x is a positive round number.  This offer type was used only in the benchmark task.  In that 
task, offers were differentiated only by their original prices.  In tasks with this offer type, we will say 
that all offers have the same price structure.  
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(2)  Type P*D:  Price details are described as an original price with a percentage discount:  
Original price = x points; Final price = Original price  y% 
where x is a positive round number and y is a round number in the interval 0 < y < 100.  In tasks with 
this offer type, we will say that offers have the same price structure if and only if they have the same 
value of y.    
(3)  Type P*D+A:  Price details are described as an original price with a percentage discount plus 
an add-on: 
Original price = x points; Final price = Original price  y% + z points 
where x and z are positive round numbers and y is a round number in the interval 0 < y < 100.  In 
tasks with this offer type, offers have the same price structure if and only if they have the same values 
of both y and z. 
(4)  Type P*D1*D2:  Price details are described as an original price with two percentage discounts: 
Original price = x points; Final price = Original price  y1%  y2% 
where x is a positive round number and y1 and y2 are round numbers in the intervals 0 < y1 < 100 and 0 
< y2 < 100.  In tasks with this offer type, offers have the same price structure if and only if they have 
the same values of both y1 and y2. 
 Whenever two offers in the same task have the same price structure, the ranking of their final 
prices is necessarily the same as the ranking of their original prices.  Thus, if two or more offers in a 
task have the same price structure, they have a common standard as defined in Section 2; if some 
price structure is unique to a specific offer, that offer has an individuated standard.   
 As explained in Section 3, the experiment used four types of task – benchmark, AC, NC and 
PC.  There was one benchmark task, using the offer type P.  Nine further tasks were constructed by 
crossing the AC, NC and PC task types with the P*D, P*D+A and P*D1*D2 offer types.  (Since 
offer type P necessarily implies that all offers have a common standard, this design is fully factorial.)  
In PC tasks, which eight of the final prices £20.270, …, £28.895 were assigned to the common 
standard was determined randomly, independently for each subject.  Thus, the standard in which an 
offer was expressed provided no information about the final price.  The ten tasks used in the 
experiment are summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 near here] 
 The four offer types were chosen to cover a range of levels of complexity.  The P type is the 
simplest that is possible in our experimental set-up.  The P*D type is unambiguously less complex 
than the P*D+A and P*D1*D2 types.  By using tasks with different degrees of complexity, we made 
it more likely that each subject would face some tasks in which the problem of working out final 
prices was perceived as difficult but manageable.  This design feature also allows us to investigate 
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whether the decision rules that subjects use are affected by the complexity of the offer type.  
Subjects were not allowed to use calculating aids or to make calculations on paper.  This rule is 
stated in the instructions routinely used in our lab.  As an additional precaution, on entering a 
session, subjects were required to put all bags, coats, phones, paper and pens on a table at the front of 
the lab.  The settings on the computers in the lab did not allow access to installed calculators. 
 Each task was presented in the form of two screen pages – the market page and the shopping 
basket page.  Screen shots of these pages are shown in Appendix B.  (All Appendices are in the 
Electronic Companion.)  At the start of the task, the subject saw the market page.  The subject’s 
endowment (in points) and the exchange rate between points and UK pounds were displayed at the 
top of the page.  One panel of the page displayed 24 coloured boxes, corresponding with the 24 
offers, which were described as the offers of 24 different ‘firms’.  The boxes were labelled ‘Offer 
A’, …, ‘Offer X’.  The allocation of actual offers to boxes was randomized.  Boxes had the same 
colour if and only if the corresponding offers had the same price structure.  In all other respects, 
colours were randomized.  No details of the offers apart from the colours and the letter codes were 
visible. 
In the market page, a subject was able to do four types of action.  (1) She could single-click 
on an offer, in which case the offer was highlighted and a message such as ‘price structure 1’ would 
immediately appear at the bottom of the page.3  (2)  She could click more than once on an offer, in 
which case the relevant price details would appear at the bottom of the screen after a three-second 
delay.  (Actions (1) and (2) could be done only for one offer at a time: if the subject clicked on a new 
offer, information about the price structure and/or price detail of the previous offer disappeared.)  (3) 
Following action (1) or (2), the subject could click a ‘Move into the shopping basket’ button, in which 
case a correspondingly coloured and labelled box immediately appeared in a ‘shopping basket’ panel 
of the market page.  The shopping basket had a maximum capacity of nine offers; subject to this 
limit, the subject could move as many offers to the basket as she wished without any time delays.  
(4) At any time, the subject could click a ‘View the shopping basket’ button, in which case she would 
move to the shopping basket page after a three-second delay. 
In the shopping basket page, the subject could immediately see the price details of all the 
offers that had been moved into the basket (and had not yet been moved out), displayed in the middle 
of the screen.  Thus, price comparisons (particularly for offers with complex price structures) could 
be made much more easily in the shopping basket page than in the market page, where the subject 
could view the price details of only one offer at a time.  In this page, the subject was able to do three 
                                                     
3 Since the numbering of price structures was arbitrary, and since the colours of the boxes showed 
which if any offers had the same price structure, this message had no real information content.  It 
served as an aid for any subjects who had difficulty distinguishing colours. 
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types of action, none of which involved any time delay.  (1) She could move any offer(s) out of the 
basket, thus creating space to add new offers from the market page.  (2) She could go back to the 
market page by clicking a ‘Continue shopping’ button.  (3) She could make a final decision by 
clicking a ‘Buy the good from firm ––’ button (where –– was the letter identifying the chosen offer). 
Because a final choice could be made only on the shopping basket page, because offers could 
be compared more easily on that page, and because the only way to tag an offer as having special 
status was to move it to that page, we expected subjects to use the shopping basket to store offers that 
they perceived as potentially choiceworthy.  If the shopping basket was used in this way, the 
evolution of its contents over the course of a task could be interpreted as the progressive building up 
and refinement of a shortlist, and so would be informative about subjects’ reasoning. 
The three-second time delays served two purposes.  First, the existence of short time delays 
replicates the fact that in real-world internet shopping there is always some time delay while opening 
and negotiating a website to find the price of a specific product, or going to a shopping basket page 
for checking out.  Second, the delay mechanism was intended to encourage subjects to use the 
shopping basket as a shortlist.  If comparisons were made in the market page, there was a three-
second delay for every offer inspected, but if offers were moved to the shopping basket before being 
compared, there was only one such delay for every batch of (up to nine) offers moved together.  
However, no time constraints were imposed.  Subjects were free to spend as long as they liked on 
any task. 
Individual subjects were paid and were free to leave the experiment after completing all their 
tasks; they did not have to wait until others had finished.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that time 
spent inspecting and comparing offers had an opportunity cost for our subjects.  In imposing search 
costs in the form of losses of time rather than of money, our design reflects most consumers’ everyday 
experience of making price comparisons – for example, by visiting competing stores in a shopping 
mall, or visiting the websites of competing suppliers.        
Before starting the formal experiment, the experimenter read out the experimental instructions 
and activated all subjects’ computer screens to let them do a practice task. The practice task was 
similar to the PC tasks but with a different offer type.  (This had the form: Original price = x points; 
Final price = Original price  y% with y > 100.)  Subjects went through the practice task step by 
step, following the experimenter’s instructions.  After finishing the practice task, subjects were given 
a questionnaire to check their understanding of the experiment.  The formal experiment began only 
after these questions had been answered correctly.  The instructions and questionnaire are 
reproduced in Appendix A.   
5.  Results: tests of Hypotheses 1–5  
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The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science 
Laboratory at the University of East Anglia in the summer of 2013.  It was implemented using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  171 subjects were recruited using a campus-wide online system.  Most 
of the subjects were students from a wide range of academic disciplines, with ages ranging from 18 to 
65.  The experiment lasted approximately 65 minutes with an average payment of £10.76 per person.  
Payments ranged from £3.10 to £11.73. 
Table 2 reports means, medians and standard deviations of the time used and of the variable 
ranked payment.  This variable measures the final prices of the offers chosen by subjects in the 
relevant task.  It uses a linear transformation of the final price scale; the value 1 denotes the lowest 
of the 24 final prices (£20.27 in all tasks) and the value 24 denotes the highest of these prices 
(£28.90).  Table 2 also reports, for each task, the percentage of subjects who chose the objectively 
optimal offer (i.e. the offer with rank 1).  
[Table 2 near here] 
In the benchmark task, the low mean and median values of ranked payment (1.88 and 1 
respectively) and the high proportion of objectively optimal choices (89.5 per cent) show that most 
subjects had little difficulty in negotiating the market and shopping basket pages and were sufficiently 
patient to search for the lowest price, despite the time delays built into the experimental interface.  
The time used in this task (mean 158 seconds, median 125 seconds) provides a useful baseline from 
which to measure the extra time used in making the more difficult price comparisons required by 
other tasks.  
Time used and ranked payments in the AC tasks are only slightly higher than in the 
benchmark task, and the proportions of optimal choices are only slightly lower.  Given the 
complexity of the arithmetic operations required to calculate final prices in the AC tasks, it is natural 
to infer that most subjects realized that, when offers have the same price structure, such calculations 
were not necessary; they simply compared original prices.  The data from NC tasks give further 
support to this inference.  It is immediately obvious from Table 2 that subjects found NC tasks much 
more difficult and time-consuming than AC tasks.  For each of the three offer types, mean and 
median values of time used and ranked payment are much higher in NC tasks than in AC tasks, and 
the proportion of optimal choices is much lower.  In all cases, these differences are highly significant 
(p < 0.001), confirming Hypothesis 1.4  Since the only difference between AC and NC tasks is the 
                                                     
4 Throughout the paper, unless otherwise stated, all within-subject tests are Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests, while for between-subjects comparisons we use Mann-Whitney tests.  All p-values are two-
sided.  We say that test results are ‘significant’ and report p values when p < 0.10; if p  0.10, we say 
that results are ‘not significant’. 
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presence or absence of a common standard, it is clear that a common standard, if used by all offers, 
makes decision-making easier and less subject to error. 
In light of the evidence reported in the previous paragraph, it seems clear that most of our 
subjects had the ability to use the ranking operation, and hence to use the LCS heuristic.  In a PC 
task, a subject who can use this heuristic has the capacity to find the offer with the lowest final price 
in the set of common-standard offers.  The ranked payment for that offer (which has an expected 
value of 2.68 in all tasks) provides a measure of what a relatively unsophisticated subject might 
realistically achieve in a PC task by taking account of ranking information.  (It sets an upper bound 
to the ranked payment that would be achieved by a subject who was ideally rational in the sense 
discussed in Section 2.)  Actual ranked payments in NC tasks provide a comparable measure of what 
subjects were able to achieve without using ranking information.  For each of the three offer types, 
mean and median ranked payments in NC tasks are higher than 2.68 (see Table 3).  The distributions 
of ranked payments in NC tasks are significantly different from those that would be induced by using 
the LCS heuristic (p < 0.001 in all three cases, using Mann-Whitney tests).  The implication is that a 
subject would do better in PC tasks by using the LCS heuristic than by ignoring the common/ 
individuated distinction.  Comparing time used in AC and NC tasks, and given that in a PC task the 
LCS heuristic requires only eight offers to be inspected and ranked, it seems likely that a typical 
subject would also save at least three minutes in each PC task by using the LCS heuristic rather than 
treating these problems like NC tasks. 
However, the data in Table 2 provide little support for Hypothesis 2.  For each offer type, 
mean and median values of ranked payment are similar in PC and NC tasks; there is a significant 
difference only for the P*D offer type (where chosen offers have lower prices in PC tasks; p = 0.056).  
Other comparisons between PC and NC tasks show a similar picture.  Time used is not significantly 
different between PC and NC tasks for any offer type.  The proportion of optimal choices is 
significantly different only for the P*D offer type (where it is higher for PC tasks; p = 0.029). 
Table 3 reports the numbers of offers inspected in each task.  An offer is defined to have 
been inspected by a subject if and only if the subject has seen its price details, either by double-
clicking it on the market page or by moving it to, and viewing it in, the shopping basket page.  In PC 
tasks, the proportion of offers inspected was significantly higher for common-standard offers than for 
individuated-standard offers (p < 0.001 for each of the three offer types), consistently with Hypothesis 
3.  In every task, however, most subjects inspected most (and often all) of the 24 offers, contrary to 
the implications of the LCS heuristic.5 
                                                     
5 For the P*D, P*D+A and P*D1*D2 offer types respectively, only 1, 1 and 2 of the 171 subjects 
inspected no individuated-standard offers, and only 7, 10 and 12 inspected fewer than four such 
offers. 
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 [Table 3 near here] 
 Table 4 reports, for each PC task, the proportion of subjects who chose common-standard 
offers in each PC task.  This is compared with the proportion of all inspected offers (summed over 
all subjects) that are common-standard.  Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the former proportion is less than 
the latter in all three tasks; this difference is significant for the P*D+A and P*D1*D2 offer types (p < 
0.001 and p = 0.011 respectively in two-sided binomial tests) but not for the P*D offer type.  Notice 
also that, in each PC task, the proportion of subjects who chose common-standard offers is less than 
one-third (i.e. the proportion of all offers that are common-standard).  Thus, despite the fact that 
common-standard offers were more likely than individuated-standard offers to be inspected, they 
were less likely to be chosen.  
[Table 4 near here] 
 Table 5 reports the frequency with which the best inspected offer was chosen in each PC task, 
conditional on whether that offer was common-standard or individuated-standard.  In the P*D task 
there is no significant difference between the two conditional frequencies.  In the P*D+A task, this 
frequency is significantly greater when the best inspected offer is individuated-standard (p = 0.050), 
contrary to Hypothesis 5.  In the P*D1*D2 task, the difference is consistent with Hypothesis 5 and 
highly significant (p < 0.001).  In Section 7, we will suggest a possible explanation for this 
conflicting evidence.  
[Table 5 near here] 
 Our conclusions so far can be summarized in the following results:  
Result 1:  Relative to the case in which all offers have individuated standards, buyers are 
better able to find low prices if all offers have a single common standard.  But this effect 
is weak or non-existent if some but not all offers have a common standard.  
Result 2:  When some but not all offers have a common standard, common-standard 
offers are more likely to be inspected than are individuated-standard offers. 
Result 3: When some but not all offers have a common standard, inspected common-
standard offers are less likely to be chosen than are inspected individuated-standard 
offers. 
Result 4: The effect described by Result 3 is stronger than that described by Result 2: 
when some but not all offers have a common standard, common-standard offers are less 
likely to be chosen than are individuated-standard offers. 
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Result 5: The evidence does not support a firm conclusion about whether, when some but 
not all offers have a common standard, the best inspected offer is more likely to be chosen 
if it is common-standard than if it is individuated-standard. 
6.  Dominance editing 
The results reported in the previous Section pose a puzzle.  It is clear that, when some but not all 
offers were priced in a common standard, subjects discriminated between those offers that were 
priced in this way and those that were not.  This discrimination had the effect that common-standard 
offers were more likely to be inspected but less likely to be chosen.  Overall, subjects gained little if 
anything (either in money or time) from the existence of common standards that allowed accurate 
comparisons among a subset of offers, despite the fact that comparisons between other offers were 
subject to considerable error.  The puzzle is to identify the property (or properties) of subjects’ 
decision processes that induced these distinctive patterns.  The methodology for this part of our 
investigation was inductive, guided by conjectures formed after reflecting on the findings reported in 
Section 5. 
 We should make clear that our concern is with properties of decision processes that are 
specifically related to common standards and so are potential explanations of the regularities we have 
found.  Since almost all subjects inspected some individuated-standard offers in PC tasks and most 
subjects inspected many, it is clear that subjects often needed to make cross-standard price 
comparisons in those tasks.  There are many way in which such comparisons might be made.  For 
example, a subject might try to reconstruct the final price of each offer, considered separately, and 
then select the offer that is judged to have the lowest final price.  Or she might use this calculating 
operation in conjunction with a stopping rule, based on an aspiration level (Simon, 1956) or a 
reservation price (Diamond, 1971; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977).  Or she might use some heuristic which 
avoids trade-offs by treating similar magnitudes as equal (Tversky, 1969; Rubinstein, 1988) or by 
prioritizing particular dimensions of price information (Brandstätter et al., 2006).  For our purposes, 
however, it is not necessary to know exactly how cross-standard comparisons were made.  Our 
experiment was not designed to investigate this issue. 
 It is useful to distinguish between three components of the decision process – inspection, 
sorting, and choice.  Through inspection, a subject arrives at a subset of offers for which price details 
are known.  Recall that, in terms of final prices, this subset is a random sample of the whole set of 24 
offers.  By sorting among inspected offers, the subject arrives at a final basket – the contents of the 
shopping basket immediately before a final choice is made.  The subject then chooses one offer from 
the final basket.  In testing Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4, we have already isolated the effects of inspection 
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in PC tasks.  For further investigation of decision processes, it is useful to isolate the effects of 
sorting in these tasks. 
 Table 6 reports the proportions of inspected common- and individuated-standard offers that 
ended up in the final basket.  This reveals a very strong and robust regularity: in all three PC tasks, 
inspected common-standard offers are under-represented in the final basket.  On average, an 
inspected offer is about twice as likely to be in the final basket if it is individuated-standard than if it 
is common-standard.  For all three tasks, this difference is overwhelmingly significant (p < 0.001).  
Table 7 reports the frequency with which the best inspected offer ends up in the final basket.  At this 
level there is no consistent asymmetry: there is discrimination against common-standard offers in the 
P*D+A task (p = 0.015) but in favour of such offers in the P*D1*D2 task (p <0.001); in the P*D task 
there is no significant discrimination either way.  The overall implication is that the sorting process 
discriminates against common-standard offers as a class, and does so by being more likely to reject 
high-price common-standard offers than to reject equivalent individuated-standard offers. 
[Tables 6 and 7 near here] 
 Table 8 isolates the final component of the decision process by reporting the frequencies with 
which the offer that is best in the final basket is chosen.  For each of the three tasks, the proportion 
of cases in which the best offer in the basket is chosen does not differ significantly according to 
whether that offer is common- or individuated-standard.  In other words, there is no evidence of 
discrimination at the choice stage, either in favour of common-standard offers or against them. 
[Table 8 near here] 
 These findings are suggestive of an operation similar to one of the editing operations that are 
applied to lotteries in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979: 274–275).6  In the context of 
our experiment, one inspected offer dominates another if they are both common-standard and if the 
original price of the former is less than that of the latter.  In such a case, it is easy to recognize that 
the dominated offer will not be the best inspected offer.  A subject who uses the dominance editing 
operation eliminates offers from consideration as soon as she becomes aware that they are dominated.  
If the shopping basket is used to store offers that are currently considered potentially choiceworthy, 
the effect of dominance editing will be to exclude or remove from the basket any common-standard 
offer that is inferior to the best such offer that has so far been inspected.  This mechanism would 
generate an overall tendency to discriminate against common-standard offers during sorting, while 
exempting the best inspected common-standard offer from this discrimination. 
                                                     
6 In the original version of prospect theory, the method by which prospects are evaluated can 
sometimes allow stochastically dominated prospects to have higher values than the prospects that 
dominate them.  Kahneman and Tversky postulate an editing operation which eliminates 
transparently dominated alternatives before any prospects are evaluated.  
19 
 
 Of course, dominance editing is not irrational in itself; in principle, it can be part of an 
optimal decision rule.  For example, a subject who makes fully accurate cross-standard price 
comparisons will end up choosing the best inspected offer whether or not she uses dominance editing.  
A second possibility is that of a subject who knows that her cross-standard price comparisons are 
subject to error and makes rational use of this knowledge.  Such a subject might use dominance 
editing in the sorting process, but offset the resulting bias by discriminating in favour of common-
standard offers when comparing them with individuated-standard offers.  (Intuitively, the subject 
would take account of the information content of the fact that, at any given moment, the surviving 
common-standard offer is the best of the common-standard offers that have so far been inspected.)  
This kind of discrimination could occur either in the sorting process or at the final choice stage (or 
both).  However, neither of these possibilities is consistent with our findings.  The evidence from 
NC tasks shows that subjects did not make accurate cross-standard comparisons.  Had subjects made 
rational use of the information available to them in PC tasks, the frequency with which common-
standard offers were chosen would have been greater than the frequency with which they were 
inspected, but we found the opposite.  These considerations suggest that dominance editing, 
combined with insufficient offsetting of the biases it induces, may have been responsible for the 
relatively high final prices paid in PC tasks. 
 One simple and salient form of dominance editing is to begin by inspecting only common-
standard offers, eliminating those that are dominated before considering individuated-standard offers.  
As a first step in investigating whether our subjects used dominance editing, we therefore looked at 
the order in which offers were inspected in PC tasks.  Table 9 shows, for each PC task and for each 
m = 0, …, 8, the number of subjects whose first eight distinct inspections included exactly m 
common-standard offers.7  For subjects who did not differentiate between common-standard and 
individuated-standard offers and who inspected eight or more offers, the distribution of m would be 
binomial, with a mean of 2.67; values of 7 and 8 would lie outside the 99 per cent confidence 
interval.8  Clearly, the hypothesis that inspections are randomly distributed must be rejected.  The 
observed distributions are very obviously bimodal, suggesting that a majority of subjects began PC 
tasks by inspecting only, or almost only, common-standard offers, while a large minority began by 
inspecting offers in random order. 
[Table 9 near here] 
                                                     
7 Very small numbers of subjects (6, 9 and 7 in the P*D, P*D+A and P*D1*D2 tasks respectively) 
inspected fewer than 8 offers.  These subjects are classified according to the total number of 
common-standard offers they inspected. 
8 Since the positions of the 24 offers on the market page were randomized independently for each 
subject, any inspection strategy that ignores the distinction between common and individuated 
standards necessarily inspects offers in random order. 
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 This finding raised the possibility that there might have been two importantly different modes 
of behaviour in our experiment.  To explore this possibility, we made a binary classification of 
subjects, separately for each PC task.  In each such task, subjects were classified as Group 1 if they 
inspected seven or eight common-standard offers in their first eight distinct inspections (or if they 
made only seven inspections, all common-standard, in the whole task), and as Group 2 otherwise.  
We then investigated whether our main results held for each of these groups separately.  In 
Appendix C we disaggregate the data on PC tasks in Tables 2–8 between the two groups.  
Unsurprisingly, given how the groups are defined, their inspection behaviour was different.  In all 
three PC tasks, the frequencies with which offers were inspected in Group 1 were significantly greater 
for common-standard offers than for individuated-standard ones, while these frequencies were 
approximately equal in Group 2.  But the sorting and choice processes of the two groups revealed 
similar qualitative patterns.  The sorting processes of both groups showed strong and highly 
significant (post-inspection) discrimination against common-standard offers, but showed no consistent 
pattern of discrimination for or against the best inspected common-standard offer.  For neither group 
was there any evidence of discrimination in favour of common-standard offers when choosing from 
the final basket. 
 Further evidence that the distinction between Groups 1 and 2 is not critical for an explanation 
of the overall bias against common-standard offers is provided by a regression analysis, reported in 
full in Appendix D.  The following is a brief summary of that analysis, as applied to PC tasks.  In 
an attempt to explain subject-level observations of ranked payments (which can be interpreted as an 
inverse measure of quality of decision) in PC tasks, we estimated an ordered probit model with 
random effects.  The independent variables were: the offer type, the number of offers inspected, the 
time spent on the task, the position of the task in the series of ten tasks faced by the subject, the 
subject’s age, the subject’s gender, whether the subject’s main field of study was related to 
mathematics or economics, whether the subject was classified as Group 1 or Group 2, and the 
subject’s classification in terms of ‘one-click’ and ‘two-click’ inspections (see footnote 9 in Section 7 
below).  We found significant effects (p < 0.05) for offer type (decision quality was highest for the 
P*D offer type and lowest for P*D1*D2), number of offers inspected (larger numbers of inspections 
were associated with better decisions), time spent (decision quality improved with time spent), 
position (decision quality improved over the course of the experiment),9 and exposure to mathematics 
or economics (decision quality was higher for subjects with such exposure).  None of the other 
variables was significant.  The significant effects are not particularly informative about the precise 
decision processes used by subjects, but they are consistent with a general picture of subjects trying to 
                                                     
9 The effect of position was not consistent across task types.  The effect of position (measured from 
1 to 10, with 1 representing the first task faced) on decision quality was positive in PC tasks (p = 
0.015), negative in NC tasks (p = 0.069), and not significant in the (very easy) AC tasks. 
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find the lowest final price in the set of inspected offers, applying fallible mental arithmetic to 
problems of varying difficulty. 
7.  The sorting process  
To gain further insights into the sorting process, we looked at the evolution of shopping basket 
contents over the course of each PC task.  To allow a simple overview of the relevant data, we need 
an interpersonally comparable unit for measuring a subject’s progress through a task.  We have 
found that the most informative way to do this is to use a measure which lines up the end of each task 
for all subjects.  Since progression through a task is determined by mouse clicks, we use a measure 
of clicking time.  We define percentiles of clicking time separately for each subject and each task.  
If a given subject made a total of N clicks during a task, her tth click is assigned to the (100t/N)th 
percentile of clicking time.  Averaging across subjects, the value of N was fairly stable across tasks 
(ranging from 57.6 to 68.6), but the standard deviation was always quite large (ranging from 15.6 to 
28.8).10  In the graphs that we will present, each unit of observation corresponds with a 10 
percentage point interval of clicking time. 
For any given offer in any given task, for any given group of subjects, and for each interval of 
clicking time, we define the in-basket probability as the probability that, for a randomly selected 
subject from that group and for a randomly selected moment in that interval, the relevant offer is in 
the subject’s shopping basket.  Formally, for any given subject, we define moments t = 1, …, N, each 
corresponding with one click.  For each moment t, for any given offer, we define the offer’s basket 
status Bt as 1 if the offer is in the shopping basket immediately after the subject’s tth click and 0 if it 
is not.  For each interval of clicking time, the probability that the offer is in the subject’s shopping 
basket is defined as the mean value of Bt, averaged over all moments in that interval.  The mean of 
these probabilities, averaged over all subjects for a given interval of clicking time, is the relevant in-
basket probability.  Figure 1 presents graphs of the evolution of the in-basket probabilities of 
different offers in the P*D task (task 8), for Group 1 and Group 2 subjects separately.  We focus on 
just one PC task in the interests of brevity.  Corresponding graphs for the P*D+A and P*D1*D2 
                                                     
10 One source of variation was a sharp division between one-click subjects who moved offers to the 
shopping basket before inspecting price details and two-click subjects who inspected price details in 
the market page before deciding whether to move offers to the basket.  In relation to the evolution of 
basket contents, the main difference between these two inspection strategies is that the one-click 
method requires every inspected offer to be in the basket for some interval of clicking time, while the 
two-click method allows unattractive offers to be eliminated without ever appearing in the basket.  
However, the qualitative patterns we will discuss were common to one-click and two-click inspection 
strategies.  There was a weak tendency (statistically significant only for the P*D+A task) for subjects 
who used the one-click strategy to be more likely to belong to Group 1.  The regression analysis 
(reported in Appendix D) found no significant difference between the final prices of the offers chosen 
by one-click and two-click subjects.     
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tasks are presented in Appendix E.  The broad qualitative patterns we will identify are common to all 
three PC tasks.   
[Figure 1 near here] 
 We begin by looking at the evolution of in-basket probabilities for common-standard offers 
and for Group 1 subjects.  The relevant graphs are shown in Figure 1a.  We classify offers 
according to their final prices.  Since the best common-standard offer has the special property that it 
can never be eliminated by dominance editing, we graph the in-basket probability of this offer 
separately.  The remaining offers are then grouped by their ranks in the set of common-standard 
offers, with higher ranks corresponding with lower final prices.  For each of the sets of ranks {2, 3}. 
{4, 5} and {6, 7, 8}, we graph the average in-basket probability of offers in that set.     
 Since the defining characteristic of Group 1 is that common-standard offers are inspected 
first, and since the most time-efficient way to inspect offers is to move them to the basket in batches, 
it is not surprising that Figure 1a shows high in-basket probabilities for all common-standard offers in 
the first intervals of clicking time.  But from the third interval, an extremely obvious asymmetry 
emerges.  The in-basket probabilities of all common-standard offers except the best decline sharply 
and then remain close to zero, while that of the best common-standard offer rises to almost 0.9 and 
then declines gently.  In other words, there is a first phase of sorting in which dominance editing is 
used to eliminate all but one common-standard offer, followed by a second phase in which the 
surviving common-standard offer is considered alongside individuated-standard offers. 
 The decline in the in-basket probability of the best common-standard offer during the later 
intervals of the task implies that significant numbers of subjects put that offer into the basket and then 
removed it.  In some cases, this could have been the result of a correct comparison between that offer 
and a superior individuated-standard offer.  But in fact, it was not uncommon even for objectively 
optimal common-standard offers to be removed from the basket in PC tasks.  Aggregating over all 
three PC tasks and over all subjects, 30.4 per cent of optimal common-standard offers were moved out 
of the basket at some stage.11   
 Figure 1b shows corresponding graphs for individuated-standard offers, again for Group 1 
subjects, using the sets of ranks {1}, {2, 3}, {4, …, 10} and {11, …, 16}.  As one would expect, in-
basket probabilities for all individuated-standard offers are very low in the first three intervals of 
clicking time (during which almost all inspections are of common-standard offers).  From then on, 
individuated-standard offers are added to the basket.  From the fifth interval there is systematic 
                                                     
11 For optimal individuated-standard offers, the corresponding proportion was 18.1 per cent.  In NC 
tasks, 21.1 per cent of optimal offers were moved out of the basket.  Unsurprisingly, objectively 
optimal offers were almost never moved out of the basket in AC or benchmark tasks. 
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sorting in favour of relatively good offers, but this sorting is far less effective than in the case of 
common-standard offers. 
 Figures 1c and 1d show the evolution of the in-basket probabilities of common- and 
individuated-standard offers for Group 2 subjects.  Recall that the inspection behaviour of Group 2 
subjects did not distinguish between common- and individuated-standard offers.  For these subjects, 
the process of sorting among common-standard offers was necessarily spread over the whole task.  It 
is clear from these graphs that, for both common- and individuated-standard offers, there was 
systematic sorting in favour of relatively good offers, but that low-ranked offers were less likely to 
remain in the basket if they were common-standard than if they were individuated-standard.12 
 The most parsimonious explanation of these findings seems to be that both groups of subjects 
used dominance editing in the sorting process and failed to compensate sufficiently for the resulting 
bias when comparing surviving common-standard offers with individuated-standard ones.  As a 
result, there was a strong overall bias against common-standard offers.  It seems clear that Group 1 
subjects used dominance editing to find the best common-standard offer before considering other 
offers.  Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that most Group 2 subjects used continuous 
dominance editing.  That is, they did not differentiate between common- and individuated-standard 
offers at the inspection stage, but progressively eliminated dominated offers during the sorting stage, 
as relations of dominance became apparent.  
 If this is an accurate characterization of the sorting process, no sharp predictions can be made 
about whether the best shortlisted offer is more likely to reach the final basket if it is common-
standard or individuated-standard.  The answer to that question depends on a balance of conflicting 
effects.  Because many subjects inspect common-standard offers first, the best shortlisted offer will 
tend to enter the shopping basket earlier if it is common-standard, and so will be more exposed to the 
hazard of being eliminated in an inaccurate comparison with an inferior offer.  But two factors work 
in the opposite direction.  First, if the best shortlisted offer is common-standard, it can ‘defeat’ seven 
of the other twenty-three offers in ranking-based comparisons; if it is individuated-standard, it does 
not have this advantage.  Second, some subjects may have some sense of the rationale for combining 
dominance editing with discrimination in favour of common-standard offers; this rationale might be 
more salient when the relationship between original and final prices is more complex.  So it is 
perhaps not surprising that, in testing whether being common-standard was an advantage or 
disadvantage for the best shortlisted offer, we found different answers for different offer types.  
Since we have relevant data for only three offer types, it would be over-interpretation to try to identify 
general patterns in these particular results.    
                                                     
12 Statistical support for this claim is provided by the evidence, referred to above and reported in the 
Appendix, that sorting by Group 2 subjects discriminated against common-standard offers. 
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8.   Discussion 
The behaviour we have observed in this experiment does not support the hypothesis that common 
pricing standards in retail markets are self-reinforcing.  When some but not all offers were priced in 
a common standard, our subjects were much better able to make price comparisons within the set of 
common-standard offers than within the set of individuated-standard offers.  If this pattern of 
behaviour were reproduced in a market, suppliers who priced in common standards would face more 
price-sensitive consumers than those who used individuated standards.  This corresponds with one 
feature of the Gaudeul-Sugden model described in Sections 2 and 3.  Contrary to that model, 
however, our subjects did not use decision rules that discriminated in favour of common-standard 
offers.  To the contrary, offers were less likely to be chosen, other things being equal, if they were 
priced in common standards.  In a market setting, such behaviour would tend to penalize firms which 
used common standards.   
 Our experimental design deliberately used mathematically complex price structures.  It is 
well known that people often find it hard to find the lowest price when price structures are complex 
(Wilson and Waddams Price, 2010; Office of Fair Trading, 2011).  It is therefore not surprising that 
our subjects often failed to find the lowest price in tasks in which there were no common standards 
(NC tasks) or in which only some offers were priced in common standards (PC tasks).  The evidence 
suggests that this was not due to any lack of effort by subjects or to any weakness of incentives.  
Recall that in each of these tasks, the median subject chose to spend around five to six minutes 
inspecting and searching offers, and inspected all or almost all the 24 available offers.  Recall too 
that subjects with more experience of mathematics or economics were more successful in finding low 
prices.  The most natural interpretation of these findings is that subjects devoted considerable effort 
to trying to compare final prices, but these efforts were sometimes defeated by the difficulty of the 
mental arithmetic involved. 
What is more interesting is that our subjects gained little or no benefit from the presence of 
common standards in PC tasks, despite the opportunities this offered for simplifying the problem of 
searching for low prices.  There is a sense in which subjects expended too much effort in these tasks: 
they failed to use a simple decision rule (the ‘largest common standard’ or LCS heuristic) that was 
clearly within their cognitive capacities and which would have allowed them to find lower prices with 
considerably less expenditure of time and effort.  Indeed, the majority of subjects (those that we have 
classified as ‘Group 1’) used a decision rule whose first stage replicated the LCS heuristic by finding 
the best common-standard offer, but then wasted both time and money by comparing this offer with 
offers priced in individuated standards. 
Our subjects may have been reluctant to use (or failed to consider using) the LCS heuristic 
because of the counter-intuitiveness of a strategy that looks at only one in every three of the available 
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offers.  Most of our subjects would have known how to carry out the arithmetic operations which, if 
applied correctly to all 24 offers, would be certain to identify the lowest price.  One possible 
interpretation of our findings is that subjects were overconfident in their ability to avoid arithmetic 
errors.  There is a long-standing psychological literature on the reliability of people’s judgements of 
confidence in their own knowledge, beliefs, skills and memory.  This research has found a prevailing 
but not universal bias towards overconfidence, particularly in relation to complex tasks (e.g. Adams 
and Adams, 1961; Oskamp, 1965; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977).  Economists and management 
scientists have been interested in overconfidence as a cause of excess market entry (Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999), excess financial trading (Barber and Odean, 2001), and excess investment by CEOs in 
their firms’ own projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  It is possible that overconfidence by 
consumers about their own cognitive abilities may make them more vulnerable to pricing practices 
which make rival offers difficult to compare. 
 An alternative (or complementary) explanation of our findings is that the operation of 
eliminating transparently dominated options has an obvious rationale and is cognitively undemanding. 
It requires much more sophisticated thinking to recognize the information contained in the fact that a 
surviving option dominates other offers that are no longer under consideration.  Viewed in this 
perspective, it is perhaps not so surprising that our subjects used dominance editing in the process of 
constructing a final ‘shopping basket’ or shortlist, but then did not compensate sufficiently for the 
resulting bias in the composition of the basket. 
It is possible that individuals would be more willing to ignore individuated-standard offers in 
situations in which they could rationalize this practice without thereby acknowledging their own 
cognitive limitations.  This might be the case, for example, if a decision had to be made within an 
externally-imposed time constraint, or if there was an explicit monetary cost for inspecting each offer 
(something that is relatively rare in real-world shopping).  The nature of the mental operations 
required to identify the best offer may also be significant.  For example, individuals might be more 
relaxed about acknowledging deficiencies in spatial judgement than in arithmetic ability (or vice 
versa).  These conjectures may help to explain differences between our results and those of an 
experiment reported by Crosetto and Gaudeul (2012), which found some evidence of the use of the 
LCS heuristic.  In a typical task in Crosetto and Gaudeul’s experiment, a subject had to make a 
decision problem within a fixed time constraint.  The problem was to purchase ‘paint’ to cover a 
fixed square area.  The prices of alternative paint products were described in terms of the cost of 
covering areas of various shapes and sizes, presented visually; in some choice problems, two or more 
products were priced in terms of areas with the same shape and size, thus creating a common 
standard. 
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Nevertheless, our conclusion has to be that we have not found support for the hypothesis that 
consumers have a basic propensity to construct shortlists that discriminate in favour of common-
standard offers.  Our findings draw attention to three factors – the psychological salience of editing 
operations which eliminate dominated options, the cognitive sophistication needed to recognize and 
correct the biases induced by these operations, and the possibility that individuals are overconfident in 
their ability to make complex price comparisons – which work against this form of shortlisting.      
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Table 1 
Properties of the tasks 
Task Task type Offer type Number of 
common 
standard offers 
Number of 
individuated 
standard offers 
     
1 Benchmark 
 
P 24 0 
     
2 AC P*D 24 0 
3 AC P*D+A 24 0 
4 AC P*D1*D2 
 
24 0 
     
5 NC P*D 0 24 
6 NC P*D+A 0 24 
7 NC P*D1*D2 
 
0 24 
     
8 PC P*D 8 16 
9 PC P*D+A 8 16 
10 PC P*D1*D2 8 16 
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Table 2  
Time used, rank of chosen offer and frequency of optimal choice in each task 
Task Task type Offer type  Time used (seconds)  Ranked payment  Proportion of optimal 
choices (%) 
    Mean 
(SD) 
Median  Mean 
(SD) 
Median   
1 Benchmark P  158 125  1.88 1  89.5 
    (104)   (3.62)    
           
 
2 
 
AC 
 
P*D 
 177 133  2.26 1  86.0 
    (145) 
 
  (4.37) 
 
   
3 AC P*D+A  187 143  2.33 1  84.8 
    (132) 
 
  (4.57) 
 
   
4 AC P*D1*D2  183 138  2.82 1  81.9 
    (121) 
 
  (5.50) 
 
   
           
5 NC P*D  344 305  5.32 3  26.3 
    (226) 
 
  (5.34)    
6 NC P*D+A  363 328  5.33 3  27.5 
    (225) 
 
  (5.52)    
7 NC P*D1*D2  398 355  7.58 5  20.5 
    (296) 
 
  (6.73)    
           
8 PC P*D  342 289  4.51 2  36.8 
    (256) 
 
  (5.18)    
9 PC P*D+A  354 304  5.51 3  21.6 
    (245) 
 
  (5.44)    
10 PC P*D1*D2  376 363  7.13 5  19.3 
    (243) 
 
  (6.51)    
There are 171 observations for each task.  ‘Ranked payment’ is a linear transformation of the final 
price of the chosen offer.  It takes the value 1 at the lowest final price (£20.27) and 24 at the highest 
final price (£28.90).  SD = standard deviation. 
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Table 3 
Numbers of common and individuated-standard offers inspected in each task 
Task Task type Offer type  Number of CS offers 
inspected 
 Number of IS offers 
inspected 
p 
    Mean 
(SD) 
Median %  Mean 
(SD) 
Median %  
1 Bench-
mark 
P  22.6 24 94.3      
    (4.52) 
 
       
            
2 AC P*D  22.3 24 93.0      
    (4.88) 
 
       
3 AC P*D+A  22.3 24 92.7      
    (4.83) 
 
       
4 AC P*D1*D2  22.4 24 93.1      
    (4.53) 
 
       
            
5 NC P*D      19.9 24 83.0  
        (6.33) 
 
   
6 NC P*D+A      19.8 24 82.4  
        (6.28) 
 
   
7 NC P*D1*D2      18.4 22 76.6  
        (6.61)    
            
8 PC P*D  7.3 8 91.2  13.5 16 84.1 <0.001*** 
    (1.78)    (4.02) 
 
   
9 PC P*D+A  7.1 8 88.3  12.9 16 80.9 <0.001*** 
    (2.12)    (4.46) 
 
   
10 PC P*D1*D2  7.0 8 87.5  12.3 15 76.8 <0.001*** 
    (2.12)    (4.61)    
There are 171 observations for each task.  CS = common standard; IS = individuated-standard; SD = 
standard deviation.  The final column reports the p-value for a signed rank test of the null hypothesis 
that, in PC tasks, the proportion of inspected offers is the same for CS and IS.  *, **, and *** 
(respectively: #, ##, and ###) denote differences in the direction predicted (respectively: not predicted) 
by Hypothesis 2 that are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels. 
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Table 4 
Frequency of choice of inspected common-standard offers in PC tasks 
Task Offer type Choices of 
common 
standard offers 
% CS offers 
inspected as % 
of all offers 
inspected 
p 
8 P*D 50 29.2 35.1 0.128 
9 P*D+A 29 17.0 35.5 <0.001### 
10 P*D1*D2 46 26.9 36.3 0.011## 
There are 171 observations for each task.  CS = common-standard; IS = individuated-standard.  The 
final column reports the p-value for a two-tail binomial test of the null hypothesis that the probability 
that a CS offer is chosen is equal to the observed ratio of inspected CS offers to total inspections 
(aggregated over all subjects).  *, **, and *** (respectively: #, ##, and ###) denote differences in the 
direction predicted (respectively: not predicted) by Hypothesis 3 that are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 
per cent levels. 
 
 
Table 5 
Frequency of choice of best inspected offer in PC tasks 
Task Offer type  If BI offer is common standard  If BI offer is individuated standard p 
   n Number of 
subjects 
choosing BI 
offer 
%  n Number of 
subjects 
choosing BI 
offer 
%  
8 P*D  61 27 44.3  110 42 38.2    0.438 
9 P*D+A  65 13 20.0  106 36 34.0    0.050# 
10 P*D1*D2  61 26 42.6  110 20 18.2   <0.001*** 
There are 171 observations for each task.  BI offer = best inspected offer.  The final column reports 
the p-value for a z-test of the null hypothesis that the probability that the BI offer is chosen is 
independent of whether that offer is common- or individuated standard.  *, **, and *** (respectively: 
#, ##, and ###) denote differences in the direction predicted (respectively: not predicted) by Hypothesis 
4 that are significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels. 
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Table 6 
Offers in final basket as proportion of offers inspected: PC tasks 
Task Offer type Number 
of CS 
offers 
inspected 
Number 
of IS 
offers 
inspected 
Number 
of CS 
offers in 
final 
basket 
Number 
of IS 
offers in 
final 
basket 
Proportion 
of 
inspected 
CS offers 
in final 
basket (%) 
Proportion 
of 
inspected 
IS offers in 
final basket 
(%) 
p 
8 P*D 
 
7.30 
(1.78) 
13.46 
(4.03) 
0.79 
(0.99) 
3.23 
(2.48) 
15.3 
(24.84) 
29.2 
(27.75) 
<0.001### 
9 P*D+A 
 
7.06 
(2.12) 
12.94 
(4.45) 
0.79 
(1.40) 
2.87 
(2.18) 
15.4 
(27.65) 
27.6 
(26.99) 
<0.001### 
10 P*D1*D2 
 
7.00 
(2.12) 
12.29 
(4.62) 
0.94 
(1.30) 
3.70 
(2.59) 
17.3 
(26.41) 
36.4 
(29.64) 
<0.001### 
Entries in table are means (standard deviations in parentheses).  CS = common standard; IS = 
individuated standard.  In task 8 (respectively: 9, 10), 0 (respectively: 3, 3) subjects inspected no CS 
offers, and 1 (respectively: 2, 1) subjects inspected no IS offers.  These subjects are excluded from 
columns 7 and 8 and from the statistical tests.  The final column reports the p-value for a signed rank 
test of the null hypothesis that the proportions of inspected CS and IS offers that ended up in the final 
basket are the same.  *, **, and *** (respectively: #, ##, and ###) denote differences, significant at the 
10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, in the direction consistent (respectively: not consistent) with the hypothesis 
that this proportion is higher for CS offers.  
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Table 7 
Frequency with which best inspected offer is in final basket: PC tasks 
Task Offer type  If BI offer is common-standard  If BI offer is individuated-standard p 
   n Number of 
subjects with 
BI offer in the 
final basket 
%  n Number of 
subjects with 
BI offer in the 
final basket 
%  
8 P*D  61 40 65.6  110 74 67.3    0. 821 
9 P*D+A  65 25 38.5  106 61 57.6    0.015## 
10 P*D1*D2  61 47 77.1  110 50 45.5 <0.001*** 
There are 171 observations for each task.  BI offer = best inspected offer.  The final column reports 
the p-value for a z-test of the null hypothesis that the probability that the BI offer is in the final basket 
is independent of whether that offer is common-standard or individuated-standard.  *, **, and *** 
(respectively: #, ##, and ###) denote differences, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, in the 
direction consistent (respectively: not consistent) with the hypothesis that the BI offer is more likely to 
be in the final basket if it is common-standard than if it is individuated-standard. 
 
 
Table 8 
Frequency with which best offer in final basket is chosen: PC tasks 
Task Offer type  If BFB offer is common-
standard 
 If BFB offer is 
individuated-standard 
 
   n Number of 
subjects 
choosing 
BFB offer 
%  n Number of 
subjects 
choosing 
BFB offer 
% p 
8 P*D  58 41 70.7  113 72 63.7 0.362 
9 P*D+A  38 22 57.9  133 87 65.4 0.395 
10 P*D1*D2  64 35 54.7  107 55 51.4 0.677 
There are 171 observations for each task.  BFB offer = best offer in final basket.  The final column 
reports the p-value for a z-test of the null hypothesis that the probability that the BFB offer is chosen is 
independent of whether BFB is common-standard or individuated-standard.  *, **, and *** 
(respectively: #, ##, and ###) denote differences, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, in the 
direction consistent (respectively: not consistent) with the hypothesis that the BFB offer is more likely 
to be chosen if it is common-standard than if it is individuated standard.  
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Table 9 
Distribution of first eight inspections in PC tasks 
Task Offer type Number of subjects who inspected m common-standard offers: m = 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8 P*D 4 17 16 17 6 4 8 18 81 
9 P*D+A 4 16 13 17 11 3 5 20 82 
10 P*D1*D2 4 19 24 10 15 3 7 13 76 
There are 171 observations for each task. 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of contents of shopping basket for task 8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
In
-b
as
ke
t 
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
Clicking time interval
Figure 1a: common standard offers: Group 1 subjects
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Figure 1b: indiviuduated standard offers: Group 1 subjects
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Figure  1c: common standard offers: Group 2 subjects
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Figure 1d: individuated standard offers: Group 2 subjects
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